allAfrica.com: Zimbabwe: Bitter Battles for Structural Power (Page 1 of 1)

THE apparent deadlock over the formation of the new Cabinet in the wake of the agreement between Zanu PF and the MDCs has caused much pessimism and despondency among ordinary Zimbabweans.

The agreement was only going to work if the parties acted in good faith and cultivated a culture of trust and confidence between them. These ingredients are, quite sadly lacking, hence the continuation of the political impasse that has so debilitated the economy of the country.

In order to gain an understanding of the current difficulties over the allocation of cabinet seats, I intend to revisit a model of power previously employed in these pages. The basic feature of that model, conveniently adapted from Susan Strange's theory of power in the international political economy, is Structural Power, which is the power to shape and determine the structures within which others operate. It is the power to set the agenda and decide how things are or should be done. The Cabinet itself the key structure for this purpose.

We saw in the past how Zanu PF traditionally uses Structural Power to set the agenda and framework in which persons operate and relate to each other within the political and economic landscape. In many ways, the battle over the cabinet is centred squarely on the desire to, on the part of Zanu PF, maintain close hold on the sources that confer structural power and on the part of the MDCs, to gain control of the same sources.

Strange identified four sources of Structural Power, namely, namely, Production, Finance, Security and Knowledge. Put simply, the proposition is that structural power is held by those that are able to first, exercise control of people's security; make decisions and control the manner of production; control the financial architecture, i.e. supply and distribution of finance and control the definition, development, dissemination, storage of and access to knowledge broadly defined to include information, ideas and beliefs. To these four we added welfare as another source of power -- the ability to provide or withdraw aid to the people.

The election season was the climax of the battles over the control of sources of Structural Power. But the elections failed to decisively deal with the issues at stake, leaving the Thabo Mbeki-mediated negotiating process to decide matters. When, therefore, the agreement was signed on 15 September 2008, after many twists and turns, the hope was that although it was a messy compromise, it would pave the way for recovery. Yet a fundamental weakness of the agreement is that it does not provide for an efficient enforcement mechanism or what little there is, is not capable of doing the job effectively.

A key shortfall is that it does not properly deal with the allocation of cabinet seats, which symbolically signify the amount of structural power that each of the parties commands under the proposed order. Yet because structural power is the key form of power that Zanu PF and the MDCs have been fighting for, it is odd that this was not properly and effectively dealt with prior to the signing of the agreement. A quick look at some of the so-called key ministries within the framework of this model should help indicate why the fight over the cabinet is simply a perpetuation of the struggle over Structural Power.

The Home Affairs ministry is chiefly responsible for policing affairs. It is part of the security apparatus, alongside the military and intelligence services. It is understood that Zanu PF will retain the Defence ministry, responsible for the armed forces. In any event, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces under the Constitution, Mugabe and Zanu PF were always going to have greater leverage in this area. The police authorities have greater day-to-day involvement with the ordinary people. Control of both the defence and police authorities would enable Zanu PF to retain the tight hold they have had over the security forces for 28 years. Within the above model, it would enable Zanu PF to have exclusive control of security as a source of structural power.

An alternative outcome in the spirit of the compromise agreement, and in order to share power arising from the security structure, would be to share the ministries that make up the security structure. Since Mugabe and Zanu PF already draw power from the military by virtue of his supreme command as President, it makes sense to allow one of the MDCs to have leadership of the police authorities. In any event, the MDCs control of the police authorities would not be as exclusive as Zanu PF fears, because under the Constitution, the Police Commissioner-General is a Presidential appointee.

The arrangement of sharing power drawn from the security structure is not new. When Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, Mugabe became Prime Minister and was also in charge of the defence ministry. His rival, Joshua Nkomo took the Home Affairs ministry. Of this arrangement, Nkomo says in his autobiography, The Story of My Life, that it was necessary for him and his party, PF Zapu that they "demand a senior ministry dealing with security matters. Robert Mugabe himself took the ministry of defence, responsible for the armed forces. I took the ministry of home affairs, in charge of the police. That seemed the formula best calculated to win the confidence of the fighting men of both armies and to contribute to the building of a real sense of impartial national security." (pp225)

These words echo very loudly in today's political environment and show why it is necessary to share power arising from the security structure.

Second, the finance ministry is critical in that it confers leverage over financial and economic matters, which represents the Finance Structure as outlined in the above model. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) has epitomised the critical role of the provision (or withdrawal) of finance and the significant power that this represents. Whoever controls this ministry and the institutions falling under it will have enormous power drawn from the finance structure. Zanu PF has had exclusive control of this ministry for 28 years. Given the state of the economy, it has not worked well and is unlikely to work any better going forward. They know that nothing will work if the old order persists. But the fear is that letting finance slip might mean letting go of the power that is drawn from the finance structure.

The same analysis applies to the power drawn from the knowledge structure, in this case the dissemination of information through the media. The agreement referred to the electronic media, including foreign-based radio stations. But it was strangely mute on the print media, where, as we have seen in the last 8 years, information laws were employed to cause the closure of a number of newspapers. Zanu PF would like to control the ministry that is responsible for information matters because it would retain its dominance of the media. The perpetual abuse of the state media, in some cases the use of hate language has continued even after the agreement was signed. For as long as Zanu PF retains the type of control that it has had over the media it means it will retain the greatest, if not exclusive control of power drawn from the Knowledge/Information structure.

In a nutshell, the on-going squabbles over cabinet positions represent the continuation of the struggle between the parties for the control over the sources of structural power. Structural power confers the ability to set the agenda. The key sources of power, namely, production, security, finance and knowledge have to be accounted for in determining the allocation of cabinet positions, because they give a symbolic (and actual) signal of who has greater leverage in the proposed government.

Zanu PF has, for a very long time enjoyed a monopoly over the sources of Structural Power. It is hard for them to give that up because it would signal a diminution of its power over the state. But given the circumstances that they face, they have very limited options. It could well happen, as a result of frustration that the MDCs could decide to walk away and leave Zanu PF in charge of all sources of structural power. But they know as well, that power under those circumstances would be meaningless. Good faith and common sense are essentially if the current impasse is to be overcome.

Alex Magaisa is based at, Kent Law School, the University of Kent.

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